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receiving this report, the court determines if the defendant is competent
to stand trial.3 1 A hearing on the issue is not required unless requested
by one of the parties.32 As with the California statute in Medina, at a
Virginia competency hearing, the party raising the issue of incompetency
must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence.33 As a practical
matter, in almost all cases this will be the defendant. Further, while there
is no statutory presumption of sanity under Section 19-2.169.1, Payne v.
Slayton34 and Graham v. Gathright35 established that a defendant is
presumed to be sane at trial.
Although the Virginia statute only requires that one expert be
ordered to evaluate the defendant's competency, there appears to be no
exclusion to a defendant being examined by an expert of his own choice.
If a hearing is held, the defendant has the right to introduce evidence and,
presumably, this evidence could include expert testimony of the
defendant's choice. The statute is silent, however, on what happens
31 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-169.1E (1990).
32 Id.
33 Id.
when an indigent defendant is unable to pay for expert assistance of his
or her choosing.
In Ake v. Oklahoma36, the United States Supreme Court held that
where a defendant's mental condition will be a significant factor at trial,
the state is required to provide an indigent defendant with psychiatric
assistance. Therefore, in a Virginia competency proceeding, if an
indigent defendant desires to be examined and assisted by a psychiatric
expert, defense counsel should argue that Ake requires the Common-
wealth to provide this assistance. Particularly in light of the Medina
decision, a compelling argument can be made that if a defendant must
bear the burden of proving incompetency, due process requires that the
means for bearing that burden must be made available.
Summary and analysis by:
Susan F. Henderson
34 329 F.Supp. 886 (W.D.Va. 1971).
35 345 F.Supp. 1148 (W.D.Va. 1972).
36 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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United States Supreme Court
During the 1992 term, the United States Supreme Court decided
three cases with potentially broad application to Virginia law, particu-
larly with respect to Virginia's "vileness" aggravating factor.1 This
summary will first examine each case individually and then attempt to
draw some broader implications from the Court's rulings in all three
cases.
CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND:
THE SPECIFICITY REQUIREMENT OF THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT
When the United States Supreme Court held that the death penalty
was not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment's proscription of
cruel and unusual punishment, it placed a duty on states that allow capital
1 Virginia law permits imposition of the death penalty for capital
murder only where at least one of two statutory aggravating circum-
stances exists. The second such factor is that "the offense was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim." Va. Code Ann. §
19.2-264.4(C) (1990). See also Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1990).
2 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J.,
punishment to establish a "meaningful method for differentiating be-
tween the few cases where [the death penalty] is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not."2 In Godfrey v. Georgia3 the Supreme Court
found that the application of the Georgia "vileness" factor failed to meet
the obligation enunciated in Furman because "nothing in [the factor's]
few words, standing alone, . . . implie[d] any inherent restraint on the
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence." The statute in
Godfrey allowed imposition of the death penalty under the exact same
terms as the Virginia statute, where the offense was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind or aggravated battery to the victim." 4 The Court found this
language to be unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
The Court revisited the issue in Maynard v. Cartwright.5 Okla-
concurring) (quoted in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
3 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by
Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
4 Ga. Code § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978).
5 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (requiring a narrowing construction of
Oklahoma "vileness" factor). See case summary of Maynard, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 15 (1988).
Page 12 - Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1
homa law permitted capital punishment where the crime was "especially
heinous, atrocious and cruel." A unanimous Court held that this language
gave no more guidance than the statute found constitutionally deficient
in Godfrey.6 The Court noted, however, that a state may salvage a vague
aggravating factor by providing a sufficient limiting construction of the
statute.
7
SinceMaynard, many state courts have further defined the statutory
terms within theirrespective "vileness" or "heinousness" factors in order
to provide the narrowing construction that Godfrey andMaynardrequire.
The Court has scrutinized these narrowing constructions to ensure that
they provide meaningful guidance to the sentencer. 8
FACTS AND HOLDINGS
I. Stringer v. Black
Stringer v. Black9 involved a collateral challenge to a Mississippi
death sentence. James R. Stringer was convicted of capital murder 10 by
a Mississippi jury for his part in a murder during the commission of a
robbery. During the penalty phase of Stringer's trial, the jury found three
statutory aggravating factors, including that the murder was "especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel"ltI (the "heinousness" factor). These terms
were not defined by the trial court. Stringer was sentenced to death, and
the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. 12 Stringer's
conviction and sentence became final on February 19, 1985, when the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 13 Stringer's state habeas
corpus challenges to his conviction were unsuccessful.
14
In federal court, Stringer brought a habeas corpus petition claiming,
inter alia, that the "heinousness" aggravating factor was unconstitution-
ally vague. Stringer argued that the use of this factor rendered his
sentence arbitrary, in violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment. The District Court found the claim
procedurally defaulted, and alternatively, ruled against it on its merits.
15
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas, finding no Eighth
Amendment violation in the jury's consideration of the "heinousness"
factor, since two other aggravating factors were also found.
16
After the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Stringer's federal habeas petition,
the Supreme Court decided Clemons v. Mississippi. 17 Clemons held that
in a state such as Mississippi, where aggravating and mitigating factors
6 Maynard, 486 U.S. at 363-64.
7 Id. at 365.
8 Although the Court has approved several narrowing construc-
tions, see, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 110 S.Ct. 3047 (1990), see case
summary of Walton, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 5 (1990),
the Court has not given blanket approval. For instance, in Shell v.
Mississippi, 111 S.Ct. 313 (1990), the Supreme Courtfound anarrowing
construction of the Mississippi "vileness" factor to be unconstitutionally
vague. The Mississippi court had defined the "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor as follows: "the word heinous
means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; atrocious means outra-
geously wicked and vile; and cruel means designed to inflict high degree
of pain with indifference to, or even enjoyment of the suffering of
others." The Supreme Court held that these definitions were "not
constitutionally sufficient." Id. See case summary of Shell, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 3 (1991).
9 112 S.Ct. 1130 (1990).
10 In Mississippi, a capital sentence may be imposed only for those
crimes designated by statute as "capital murder." Miss. Code Ann. § 97-
3-19(2) (Supp. 1991). One such crime is a killing in the course of a
burglary or robbery.
11 See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(h) (Supp. 1992).
12 Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468 (Miss. 1984).
13 Stringer v. Mississippi, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985).
are "weighed" by the sentencer, a death sentence which is based on an
unconstitutional aggravating factor along with one or more legitimate
factors is invalid unless the state appellate court independently reweighs
the legitimate factors or finds the error to be harmless. 18 The Supreme
Court subsequently vacated the Fifth Circuit's Stringer v. Jackson
opinion for further consideration in light of Clemons.19
On remand, the Fifth Circuit ruled that Stringer was not entitled to
rely on Clemons or the related case of Maynard v. Cartwright20 because
they both announced "new rules" which were not available for relief
when Stringer's conviction had become final. The Fifth Circuit's
analysis was based on the doctrine of Teague v. Lane,2 1 which prohibits
the retroactive application of any "new rule" to a habeas petitioner whose
conviction became final before that rule was announced. Teague defines
a "new rule" as one which "breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation on the States or the Federal Government ... [or] if the result
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's
conviction became final."
'22
The Supreme Court granted Stringer's petition for certiorari to
determine whether a habeas corpus petitioner whose death sentence
became final before Maynard and Clemons is forclosed by Teague from
relying on those cases. 23 In a surprising six to three decision (Justice
Kennedyjoinedby ChiefJusticeRehnquist andJustices White, Blackmun,
Stevens and O'Connor), the United States Supreme Court reversed String-
er's sentence of death because it had been based on the vague "heinous-
ness" aggravating factor and the state appellate court had never engaged
in the reevaluation required by Clemons.24 The Court held that Teague
does not prevent the retroactive application of Maynard and Clemons.
25
The Court pointed to Godfrey as the case which dictated the result
in Maynard. Stringer thus held that the Maynard Court "did not 'break[]
new ground"' in applying Godfrey to Oklahoma's "heinousness" aggra-
vating factor.26 As a result of this ruling, Stringer, whose conviction and
sentence became final after Godfrey but before Maynard, was entitled to
rely upon Maynard in collateral proceedings.
Despite this initial holding, the State of Mississippi further argued
that prior to Clemons (which was decided after Stringer's sentence had
become final), it would have been a "new rule" to apply Godfrey to
Mississippi, based upon claimed fundamental differences between the
sentencing schemes of Georgia (in Godfrey) and Mississippi. The State
argued that Mississippi's status as a "weighing" state27 differentiated it
14 Stringer v. State, 485 So.2d 274 (Miss. 1986).
15 Stringer v. Scroggy, 675 F.Supp. 356, 366 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
16 Stringer v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1988).
17 494 U.S. 738 (1990). See case summary of Clemons, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 8 (1990).
18 Id.
19 Stringer v. Jackson, 494 U.S. 1074 (1990).
20 486 U.S. 356 (1988). For a discussion of Maynard, see supra
notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
21 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
22 Id. at 301 (emphasis in original).
23 Stringer v. Black, 111 S.Ct. 2009 (1991).
24 Stringer v. Black, 112 S.Ct. 1130 (1992).
25 Id. at 1135-36.
26 Stringer at 1135 (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407
(1990) (holding that under Teague, the result of a case is not "dictated by
precedent" - and thus a "new rule" is present - if the issue was
"susceptible to debate among reasonable minds" at the relevant time).
See case summary of Butler, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 2
(1990)).
27 A "weighing" state is one in which the sentencer, after convict-
ing a defendant of capital murder and finding at least one aggravating
factor, must weigh aggravating factors against mitigating factors.
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from Georgia, a "non-weighing" state,28 and that several factors
rendered the applicability of Godfrey to a weighing state "susceptible to
debate among reasonable minds" in 1985.29
The Court rejected the State's argument, holding that Teague does
not foreclose the retroactive application of Clemons.30 According to the
Stringer Court, Clemons merely applied a "clear principle" which
emerged from a "long line of authority setting forth the dual constitu-
tional criteria of precise and individualized sentencing." 31 Indeed, the
majority stated that to the extent differences existed between the Georgia
scheme in Godfrey and Mississippi's scheme, the difference argued even
more strongly for reevaluation of a death sentence, because under the
Mississippi scheme, jurors were required to weigh the aggravating
factors that they had found.32 The Court concluded that the "use of a
vague or imprecise aggravating factor in the weighing process invali-
dates the sentence and at the very least requires constitutional harmless-
error analysis or re-weighing in the state judicial system.
'33
H. Sochor v. Florida
Dennis Sochor was charged and convicted of capital murder by a
Floridajury. After a capital conviction in Florida, the trial court conducts
a two-step penalty hearing to determine the appropriate punishment.
34
The prosecution and defense present aggravating and mitigating evi-
dence before the jury and the judge. In the first step of the proceeding,
the court charges the jury to weigh any aggravating or mitigating factors
that they find and then reach an advisory verdict by majority vote.35 The
jury is not required to disclose the aggravating and mitigating factors that
they find. During the second step, the trial judge ultimately issues the
penalty.36 If the trialjudge decides to impose the death penalty, the judge
must issue a written statement of the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances which he or she finds.37 The sentence is then subject to automatic
review by the Florida Supreme Court.
38
At Sochor's penalty hearing, the trial court instructed the jury as to
the possibility of finding any of four aggravating factors. Two of the
factors were: (1) that the crime was "especially wicked, evil, atrocious
or cruel" 39 (the "heinousness" factor), and (2) that the crime was
committed in a "cold, calculated and premeditated manner, without any
pretense of moral or legal justification" 40 (the "coldness" factor). The
jury recommended that the death penalty be imposed, by a ten to two
vote. The trial judge followed the jury's recommendation, finding that
all four aggravating factors and no mitigating factors existed.
28 In a "non-weighing" state, the sentencer must only find the
existence of one or more aggravating factors in order to sentence a
convicted capital defendant to death. Mitigating factors must still be
considered, but there is no formal "weighing" process.
29 The State again relied upon Teague and Butler in support of this
argument.
30 Stringer, 112 S.Ct. at 1136.
31 Id. at 1137.
32 Id. at 1136.
33 Id. at 1140.
34 Fla. Stat. § 921.141(1) (1991).
35 Fla. Stat. § 921.141(2) (1991).
36 Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3) (1991).
37 Id.
38 Fla. Stat. § 921.141(4) (1991).
39 SeeFla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(h) (1991). The statuteitselfstates this
factor as "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," while the typical jury
instruction states the factor as "especially wicked, evil, atrocious, or
cruel." See, e.g., Smalley v. State, 546 So.2d 720, 722 (Fla. 1991).
40 See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(i) (1991).
41 Sochor v. State, 580 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1991).
42 Id. at 602-603.
43 Id. at 603, n.10.
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed Sochor's conviction and
sentence.4 1 In so doing, the court rejected Sochor's arguments that the
"heinousness" and "coldness" factors were unconstitutionally vague.
The Florida court held that the issues were procedurally defaulted for
failure to object and then stated, "[i]n any event, Sochor's claims here
have no merit."42 In a footnote to that passage, the court stated, "[w]e
reject without discussion Sochor's ... claims that the instructions as to
the aggravating factors of heinous, atrocious, or cruel[;] and cold,
calculated, and premeditated were improper."
43
The Florida Supreme Court agreed, however, with Sochor's con-
tention that the "coldness" factor was unsupported by the evidence in his
case, holding that that factor requires a heightened degree of premedita-
tion that was not present in Sochor's case.44 Despite that ruling, the
Florida Supreme Court affirmed Sochor's conviction and sentence,
finding that the sentence was "proportionate" to the crime.45 The court
noted that even without the "coldness" factor, the trial judge found three
other aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances. The
court stated that, "[sitriking one aggravating factor when there are no
mitigating circumstances does not necessarily require resentencing."
46
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on direct review
to consider two issues: (1) whether the application of Florida's "heinous-
ness" factor to Sochor violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments;
and (2) whether the Florida Supreme Court's review of Sochor's death
sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments where the court
upheld the sentence despite the trial court's instruction on, and application
of, the inapplicable "coldness" aggravating factor.47
The Supreme Court refused to consider Sochor's claim that the trial
court's jury instruction on the Florida "heinousness" factor was uncon-
stitutionally vague.48 The Court reasoned that the issue had been decided
by the Florida courts on the "adequate and independent" state ground of
procedural default.49 In making this ruling, the Court relied upon the
Florida Supreme Court's ambiguous dismissal of the issue as stating with
"requisite clarity" that Sochor's claim was unsuccessful due to his failure
to preserve the issue.
50
The Court also rejected Sochor's arguments that the trial court's
application of the "heinousness" factor was violative of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 5 1 The Court relied on its holding in Walton v.
Arizona52 that a trial court may weigh a statutory aggravating factor
which is impermissibly vague, if the highest state court had previously
given constitutionally acceptable narrowing constructions of the fac-
tor.53 The Court found such constructions in State v. Dixon,5 4 where the
44 Id. at 603.
45 Id. at 604.
46 Id. (citations omitted).
47 Sochor v. Florida, 112 S.Ct. 436 (1991).
48 Sochor v. Florida, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2120 (1992) (Souter, J.,




51 Sochor, 112 S.Ct. at 2121 (Souter, J.,joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.).
52 497 U.S. 639 (1990). See case summary of Walton, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 5 (1990).
53 Sochor, 112 S.Ct. at2121.
54 283 So.2d 1,9 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974) ("It
is our interpretation that heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly
evil; that atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and, that cruel
means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to,
or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. What is intended to be
included are those capital crimes where the actual commission of the
capital felony was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime
apart from the norm of capital felonies - the conscienceless or pitiless
crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.").
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Florida Supreme Court defined the relevant terms in the state's "heinous-
ness" factor. The United States Supreme Court had previously deter-
mined that the Dixon limitation of the factor to only "conscienceless or
pitiless crime[s] which [are] unnecessarily torturous to the victim," gave
adequate guidance to the sentencer.
55
Instead, the Court reversed Sochor's conviction based on the trial
court's application of the "coldness" aggravating factor, which the
Florida Supreme Court determined was inapplicable to the facts of
Sochor's case as a matter of state law.5 6 Before reaching this conclusion,
the Court rejected Sochor's claim that Eighth Amendment error occurred
as a result of the jury's consideration of the inapplicable "coldness"
aggravating factor.5 7 The Court reasoned that since a capital jury in
Florida does not reveal the factors relied upon in reaching its recommen-
dation, it cannot be known whether Sochor's jury actually applied the
inapplicable factor. Relying on Griffin v. United States,5 8 the Court
found that"although ajury is unlikely to disregard a theory flawed in law,
it is indeed likely to disregard an option simply unsupported by evi-
dence." 5 9 Because of this likelihood, the Court declined to presume jury
error.
6 0
Eight members of the Supreme Court, however, held that the trial
court's application of the inapplicable "coldness" aggravating circum-
stance violated the Eighth Amendment.6 1 The Court determined that a
factor which is unsupported by the evidence under state law is an
"invalid" factor for purposes ofClemons v. Mississippi,6 2 and, therefore,
the Eighth Amendment prevents the sentencer from weighing that
factor.6 3
Five justices further held that the Florida Supreme Court's determi-
nation that Sochor's sentence was "proportional" did not cure the trial
court's error of applying an invalid aggravating circumstance. 64 The
Courtemphasized that in considering adeath sentence where the sentencer
has unconstitutionally applied an invalid aggravating circumstance, a
reviewing state court must either independently reweigh the valid factors
or apply harmless error analysis to the constitutional flaw.6 5 Because a
state's "proportionality" review is quite different from either of these
processes, the Court vacated the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court
and remanded.
6 6
III. Espinosa v. Florida
Henry Jose Espinosa was convicted of first degree murder by a
Florida jury. During Espinosa's penalty hearing,6 7 the trial court
55 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
56 Sochor, 112 S.Ct. at 2122-23.
57 Id. at 2122 (Souter, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White,
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.).
58 112 S.Ct. 466 (1991).
59 Sochor, 112 S.Ct. at 2122 (Souter, J.,joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
and White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.).
60 Id. For an example of a situation where jury error is presumed
based on the unlikelihood that a jury will "disregard a theory flawed in
law," see Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S.Ct. 2926 (1990). See infra notes 67-
79 and accompanying text.
61 Id. at 2122 (Souter, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White,
Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JI.).
62 494 U.S. 738 (1990). For a discussion of Clemons, see supra
notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
63 Sochor, 112 S.Ct. at 2122.




6 7 Foradiscussion of Florida's statutory capital sentencing scheme,
see supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
provided instructions on several aggravating factors. Among the given
instructions was the aggravating factor that the murder was "especially
wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel. ' 68 The jury recommended the death
penalty, and the trial court followed that recommendation, finding four
valid aggravating factors and two mitigating factors.
Espinosa appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the
"wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel" instruction was unconstitutionally
vague. The court rejected Espinosa's argument, relying on Smalley v.
State,69 and affirmed the conviction and sentence.70 In Smalley, the
Florida Supreme Court had concluded that Florida capital juries need not
be instructed with the specificity mandated in Maynard v. Cartwright71
and Godfrey v. Georgia72 because a Florida jury is not the "sentencer"
for Eighth Amendment purposes.73 Because thejury's recommendation
is not binding on the trial judge, the Smalley court concluded that a
Florida jury can be instructed on a vague aggravating factor consistently
with the constitution.
74
Espinosa petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari,
contending that his Eighth Amendment rights had been infringed by the
vague instruction. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed
Espinosa's sentence based on the vague aggravating factor instruction
which was given to the jury.75 The Court rejected the state's argument
that a Florida capital jury is not the "sentencer" for Eighth Amendment
purposes.76 The Court pointed to Florida law requiring the trial court (the
ultimate decisionmaker in Florida) to give "great weight" to the jury's
recommendation. 77 Although the trial court did not weigh any invalid
aggravating circumstance at Espinosa's trial, the United States Supreme
Court stated that it must "presume that the jury did so... just as we must
presume that the trial court followed Florida lawv... and gave 'great
weight' to the resultant recommendation." 78 Because a recommending
jury's weighing of an unconstitutionally vague aggravating circum-
stance "creates the same potential for arbitrariness as the direct weighing
of an invalid aggravating factor," the consideration of that factor by
Espinosa's jury was Eighth Amendment error.
79
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In this trilogy of cases, the United States Supreme Court provided
awealthof information about the specificity requirement for aggravating
factor instructions and the duty of a reviewing state court when an invalid
factor has been applied. The Court reemphasized that vague aggravating
factors pose a significant threat of arbitrariness in capital sentencing. As
68 See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(h) (1991). See also supra note 20.
69 546 So.2d 720 (Fla. 1991).
70 Espinosa v. State, 589 So.2d 887, 894 (Fla. 1991).
71 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
72 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
73 Smalley v. State, 546 So.2d 720, 722 (Fla. 1991).
74 Id.
75 Espinosa v. Florida, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 2928-29 (1992) (per
curiam).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 2928.
78 Id. (citations omitted).
In contrast, the Supreme Court will not presume jury error
where the flawed instruction is based on a theory which is "simply
unsupported by evidence." Sochor v. Florida, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2122
(1992), see supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text. This is because
a jury "is indeed likely to disregard" such an option. Id.
79 Id. Espinosa is reconcilable with Sochor in that the issue in
Espinosa - the weighing of a vague aggravating factor by the jury -
was procedurally defaulted in Sochor. See supra notes 48-50 and
accompanying text.
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a result, the specificity requirement of Godfrey applies to all sentencing
schemes, in both "weighing" and "non-weighing" states. The specificity
requirement also applies to ajury instruction where the jury's conclusion
is only a recommendation in which it is unknown which factors were
actually applied by thejury. Additionally, the Court ruled that the results
in Maynard and Clemons were "dictated" by Godfrey, allowing subse-
quent habeas petitioners to rely on those two cases, no matter when their
sentences became final. From this trilogy of cases, several valuable
lessons can be derived.
I. The United States Supreme Court Continues To Take
Godfrey v. Georgia's Ban On Vague Aggravating Factors
Seriously
Stringer represents a welcome departure from recent Supreme
Court retroactivity rules. However, it is unlikely that Stringer fundamen-
tally changes the analysis for determining when a "new rule" may be
retroactively applied. Rather, it is more likely that the Supreme Court is
willing to apply retroactivity rules in a less rigid fashion when vague
aggravating factor instructions are at issue.
The Court has been involved in a systematic expansion of the "new
rule" doctrine of Teague v. Lane since 1989. The seemingly benign
holding that "a 'new rule' may not be retroactively applied" has had an
enormous impact due to the Court's broad definition of a "new rule" in
subsequent cases. The Court generally has found that any issue which
is somewhat unclear leads to a "new rule" when the issue is resolved. 80
The question that the Court asks in order to decide if a "new rule" is at
stake has changed from the Teague inquiry of whether the case "breaks
new ground" to the more easily satisfied Butler inquiry of whether the
holding at issue was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds."8 t
Thus, in order for a habeas petitioner to claim constitutional error based
on a Supreme Court ruling decided after his or her sentence became final,
the petitioner typically must show that the rejection of the claim on direct
appeal was "so clearly invalid under then-prevailing legal standards that
the decision could not be defended by any reasonable jurist."
'82
The first issue in Stringer was whether Maynard announced a "new
rule." Thus, the Court looked to the time when Stringer's conviction
became final, February 19, 1985, and determined that the Maynard issue
was not "susceptible to debate among reasonable mind" at that time.
83
This holding is consistent with previous retroactivity rules. Godfrey found
that the words "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" were
vague and imprecise, inviting arbitrary application of the death penalty.
After Godfi-ey, it certainly wa not "new" for the Maynard Court to find
80 Butler v. McKellar, 110 S.Ct. 1212 (1990).
81 Id. at 1217.
82 Id. at 1219 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's ruling that any legal
issue which was previously "susceptible to debate among reasonable
minds" results in a "new rule" when that issue is subsequently resolved)
(emphasis in original).
83 Stringer, 112 S.Ct. at 1135.
84 494 U.S. at 753.
85 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
86 Id. at 890.
87 Id. (emphasis added).
88 Stringer, 112 S.Ct. at 1136.
89 Butler, 110 S.Ct. at 1217.
90 Stringer, 112 S.Ct. at 1137.
91 Id. at 1137.
92 This approach is also consistent with Espinosa v. Florida, 112
S.Ct. 2926 (1992), see supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text. In
that the words "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" were also violative
of the Eighth Amendment.
Stringer's determination that Clemons did not announce a "new
rule," however, is somewhat surprising. The issue in Clemons was
whether a sentencing scheme in which the sentencer weighs a vague
aggravating factor with a valid aggravating factor violates the Eighth
Amendment. Clemons held that in a "weighing" state, the application of
a vague aggravating factor creates a risk of arbitrariness which the Eighth
Amendmentdoesnottolerate. 84 Thus, whereadeath sentence is based onvalid
and invalid aggravating factors which have been weighed together, a violation
of the Eighth Amendment can only be avoided by an independent "re-
weighing" process by the state appellate court, without the invalid factor.
Prior to Clemons, the Court had specifically reserved this issue in
Zant v. Stephens.85 In Zant, the Court held that in a state where no formal
weighing process takes place, the use of an invalid aggravating factor does
not require invalidation of the sentence, so long as the sentence is
supported by at least one valid aggravating factor.86 However, the Court
expressly stated that it voiced no "opinion concerning the possible signifi-
cance of a holding that a particular aggravating circumstance is 'invalid'
under a statutory scheme in which the judge or jury is specifically
instructed to weigh statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in
exercising its discretion whether to impose the death penalty.-
87
Prior to Clemons, the Court had offerred no indication of how the
question reserved in Zant might be resolved. Indeed, even the majority in
Stringer characterizes theZant language as a mere "possibility" of how the
issue would be decided. 88 Applying the rigid rules of Teague and Butler,
certainly the issue was "susceptible to debate among reasonable minds
' 89
in 1985. However, the Court in Stringer held that Clemons did not
announce a new rule.90 In making its ruling that Clemons was dictated by
precedent, the Court stated that "[t]his clear principle emerges not from
any single case .... but from our long line of authority setting forth the dual
constitutional criteria of precise and individualized sentencing."
91
That the Supreme Court had a clear opportunity to reject Stringer's
Clemons claim based on Teague, but chose not to do so, is informative. It
seems that the Courtis willing to relax the procedural formalities of Teague
in order to ensure that states meaningfully channel the sentencer's discre-
tion in death penalty cases.92 The Court's more flexible application of
retroactivity rules in Stringer underscores the importance of raising and
preserving vagueness challenges to the Virginia "vileness" aggravating
factor. The strong, overriding message of Stringer is that the current United
States Supreme Court continues to take the specificity rule of Godfrey
seriously. Virginia attomeys would be well advised to do the same.
Espinosa, the Court could have found that since a Floridajury's decision
is only a recommendation, the jury is not a "sentencer" for Eighth
Amendment purposes. Under this approach, the jury's consideration of
an invalid aggravating factor would not give rise to Eighth Amendment
error, so long as the trial judge, who actually determines the appropriate
penalty, does not consider the invalid factor.
However, the Court ruled that the jury does play an important
role in Florida capital sentencing. Because Florida law requires the
sentencing judge to give "great weight" to the jury's recommendation,
the Court held that a Florida judge "indirectly weigh[s]" the invalid
factor: "This kind of indirect weighing of an invalid aggravating factor
creates the same potential for arbitrariness as the direct weighing of an
invalid aggravating factor, and the result, therefore, was error." Id. at
2928.
In Espinosa, as in Stringer, the United States Supreme Court
displayed an unusual eagerness to address the merits of the Eighth
Amendment issue, despite a clear opportunity to deny relief and decide
the case on much more narrow grounds.
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II. Attorneys Should Continue To Raise and Preserve the
Claim that Virginia's "Vileness" Aggravating Factor Is
Unconstitutionally Vague
One of the few federal claims which has proved successful in recent
capital penalty litigation is that an aggravating factor fails to sufficiently
narrow the sentencer's discretion. Stringer, Sochor, and Espinosa,
collectively, reaffirm this trend. In both Stringer and Espinosa, a death
row inmate receivedjudicial relief based on the vagueness of aggravating
factors applied in determining the appropriate penalty. In Sochor, the
Court granted relief based on an aggravating factor which was invalid
under Florida law, and indicated in dicta that relief might also have been
appropriate on the vagueness issue but for a procedural default.
It has often been noted that Virginia's "vileness" aggravating factor
is identical to the one found unconstitutionally vague in Godfrey.
93
Virginia permits a death sentence for a murder which is "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind or aggravated battery to the victim."94 Under Godfrey and
Maynard, Virginia may apply its "vileness" factor only if the courts
closely monitor its use and provide narrowing constructions of this vague
language.
95
So far, the Virginia Supreme Court has defined only two of the three
factors listed within its vileness predicate. Smith v. Commonwealth
96
defines "depravity of mind" as "a degree of moral turpitude and psychic
debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of legal malice and
premeditation." Smith also defines "aggravated battery" as "a battery
which is qualitatively and quantitatively more culpable than the mini-
mum necessary to accomplish an act of murder."'97 The term "torture,"
meanwhile, remains undefined in Virginia.
In Jones v. Murray,98 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals approved
the Virginia narrowing constructions announced in Smith. However, the
United States Supreme Court has not yet passed on the issue, and the
definitions provided in Smith are constitutionally suspect. 99 In the words
of Furman, Virginia's "narrowing" constructions are hardly a "meaning-
ful basis for distinguishing those few cases in which [the death penalty]
is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." 100 Indeed, the
definitions themselves imply that all capital murders, save the singular
case with the least "vileness," warrant the ultimate penalty. Addition-
ally, the definitions lack specificity and, if anything, confuse more than
they clarify.
Even though Virginia's capital sentencing scheme partially nar-
rows the class of offenders who are eligible for the death penalty at the
guilt phase, 101 any attempt to further narrow that class with aggravating
factors must be done with specificity. The Supreme Court stated in
93 See Case summary of Bunch v. Thompson, Captial Defense
Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 3 (1992); Case summary of Shell v. Mississippi,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 3 (1991); Lago, Litigating the
"Vileness" Factor in Virginia, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p.
25 (1991); Falkner, The Constitutional Deficiencies of Virginia's
"Vileness" Aggravating Factor, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1,
p. 19 (1989); Priddy, Comment, Godfrey v. Georgia: Possible Effects on
Virginia's Death Penalty Law, 15 U. Rich. L. Rev. 951 (1981).
94 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1990); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.4(C) (1990).
95 Maynard, 486 U.S. at 356.
96 Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455,478,248 S.E.2d 135,148-
49 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
97 Id.
98 947 F.2d 1106 (1991). See case summary of Jones, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 5 (1992).
99 See Shell v. Mississippi, 111 S.Ct. 313 (1990); see supra note 8
and accompanying text.
Stringer that "[a]lthough our precedents do not require the use of
aggravating factors, they have notpermitted aState in which aggravating
factors are decisive to use factors of vague or imprecise content."
102
Attorneys should continue to vigorously litigate this issue pre-trial,
during trial, and on appellate and collateral review. A useful tool to
preserve a challenge to the Virginia "vileness" factor is a pre-trial motion
for a bill of particulars. In such a motion, defense attorneys can request
that the court direct the Commonwealth to identify what aggravating
factors it intends to rely upon in seeking the death penalty. Further, if the
Commonwealth intends to rely upon the "vileness" factor, the motion
should request identification of every narrowing construction of that
factor upon which the Commonwealth intends to rely.
If no such identification is provided, defense counsel can preserve
the challenge for appeal by filing a brief arguing that the Virginia death
penalty scheme is unconstitutionally applied without such narrowing
constructions, relying upon Godfrey and Maynard. If the Common-
wealth responds with the Smith narrowing constructions, defense coun-
sel can preserve the challenge with a motion that the narrowing construc-
tions are themselves unconstitutionally vague under Shell.
III. Using Stringer, Sochor, and Espinosa to Frame
Vileness Challenges To The Virginia Supreme Court
Stringer, Sochor, and Espinosa place an obligation on every state to
ensure that aggravating factor jury instructions meaningfully guide the
sentencer's discretion. There are two components to this obligation.
First, since Virginia's "vileness" aggravating factor is unconstitutionally
vague,103 the Virginia courts must supply constitutionally sufficient
narrowing constructions. Second, if ajury renders a death sentence using
a vague aggravating factor without a sufficient narrowing construction,
the Virginia Supreme Court must expressly and with explanation either
independently reweigh the valid aggravating and mitigating factors or
find that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
A. The Virginia Supreme Court Must Apply
Constitutionally Adequate Narrowing Constructions
As noted above, Virginia's current narrowing constructions are
constitutionally suspect. 104 Indeed, the Virginia definitions 105 are much
less informative than the Mississippi narrowing constructions found
unconstitutionally vague in Shell v. Mississippi.
106
Virginia does not require that its suspect narrowing constructions be
provided for the sentencing jury.107 Consequently, Virginia's reviewing
courts must themselves monitor the application of those factors to each
100 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added) (quoted in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 188 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
101 See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (1990).
102 Stringer, 112 S.Ct. at 1139.
103 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
104 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
105 "Depravity of mind" is "a degree of moral turpitude and
psychic debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of legal
malice and premeditation," and "aggravated battery" is "a battery which
is qualitatively and quantitatively more culpable than the minimum
necessary to accomplish an act of murder." Smith v. Commonwealth, 219
Va. 455,478,248 S.E.2d 135, 148-49 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967
(1979).
106 111 S.Ct. 313 (1990). ("heinous means extremely wicked or
shockingly evil; atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and
cruel means designed to inflict high degree of pain with indifference to,
or even enjoyment of the suffering of others.")
107 Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201,257 S.E.2d 784 (1979).
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case individually. In the past, the Virginia Supreme Court has not
explicitly done so. 108 In Jones v. Murray, 10 9 the Fourth Circuit salvaged
a death sentence in which the Virginia Supreme Court had not specifi-
cally applied any narrowing construction. The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that the Virginia Supreme Court's ruling on direct review that the death
penalty is not "disproportionate" implicitly includes an application of the
Smith narrowing factors.1 t0
In Sochor v. Florida, the State of Florida made an argument exactly
like the one used by the Fourth Circuit in Jones. The Florida Supreme
Court, in upholding Sochor's death sentence, had not applied any
narrowing construction to its vague aggravating factor. The Supreme
Court rejected the State's argument that the Florida Supreme Court's
"proportionality" review cured the error.1 II The Court affirmatively
held that a"proportionality" ruling is a"quite different enquiry" from the
question of whether an improper aggravating factor tainted the trial
court's death sentence.
112
What this means in Virginia is that in every case involving the
vileness aggravating factor, the Virginia Supreme Court must expressly
examine whether the facts meet its narrowing construction of vileness
and explain its findings. The United States Supreme Court has repeat-
edly stressed that application of the narrowing construction must occur
at some point within the state system. Since Virginia juries are not given
instructions on how the vileness factor has been narrowed, that clear
constitutional duty falls upon the Virginia Supreme Court. The court's
explanation will then supply full grounds for challenging the inadequacy
of the narrowing construction to the United States Supreme Court and in
federal habeas.
B. Without Constitutionally Sufficient Narrowing
Constructions, The Virginia Supreme Court Must
Find That Application Of The Vague Aggravating
Factor Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
If the Virginia Supreme Court should find that the vileness aggra-
vating factor was unconstitutionally applied in a particular case, it is then
faced with the obligation of taking further action. If the only aggravating
factor found was vileness, the court has no choice but to reverse since no
other valid aggravating factor could support the sentence of death. If the
future dangerousness aggravating factor also was found, then the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court should be required to expressly find that reliance on
the vileness aggravating factor was harmless error or engage in a full
reweighing of the mitigating and aggravating evidence.
Stringer held that where a death penalty is based upon multiple
aggravating circumstances, one of which is invalid, the state appellate
108 Prior to 1992, the Virginia Supreme Court's practice has been
merely to affirm the finding of "vileness," to detail specific aspects of the
crime, and to find the penalty not "excessive" or "disproportionate." See,
e.g., Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 404 S.E.2d 227 (1991);
Quesinberty v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 402 S.E.2d 218 (1991);
George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264,411 S.E.2d 12 (1990); Spencer
v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 393 S.E.2d 609 (1990).
More recently, however, the Virginia Supreme Court has at
least cursorily applied the Smith factors. See e.g., Thomas v. Common-
wealth, 244 Va. 1,419 S.E.2d 606 (1992); Mueller v. Commonwealth,
Nos. 920287, 920449, 1992 Va. LEXIS 97 (1992). In Thomas and
Mueller, the Virginia Supreme Court has identified which narrowing
construction of the "vileness" factor is applicable.
court must determine "that the invalid factor would not have made a
difference to the jury's determination." 1t 3 This inquiry is not one which
may be resolved in a conclusory manner. The Court emphasized that a
reviewing court "may notmake the automatic assumption that [an invalid
aggravating factor] has not infected the weighing process."'1 14 The state
appellate court must closely scrutinize each case to determine the impact
which the invalid factor had on the sentencer.
One example of the high level of scrutiny required in this process is
Sochor. The Florida Supreme Court, in finding Sochor's sentence
"proportionate," stated that:
The trial court carefully weighed the aggravating factors against
the lack of any mitigating factors and concluded that death was
warranted. Even after removing the aggravating factor of cold,
calculated, and premeditated there still remain three aggravat-
ing factors to be weighed against no mitigating circumstances.
Striking one aggravating factor when there are no mitigating
circumstances does not necessarily require resentencing."
115
The Court found this discussion insufficient to cure the trial court's error.
Sochor holds that state appellate courts must "explain" the basis for
upholding the sentence. 116 As Justice O'Connor noted, the "justifiably
high standard.., can be met without uttering the magic words 'harmless
error,' ... [but] the reverse is not true."'1 17 The Supreme Court requires
a "'principled explanation' of how the [state] court reached [its] conclu-
sion."t18
CONCLUSION
In Stringer, Sochor, andEspinosa, the United States Supreme Court
has reaffirmed the extremely significant issue of specificity in aggravat-
ing factor instructions. Due to the indifference of the Virginia courts in
addressing this important issue, many attorneys may feel that pursuing
it is futile. However, it is this very judicial indifference that makes a
vagueness challenge even more likely to succeed now than it ever has
been in the past. The United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed that
state courts must actively ensure that aggravating factors meaningfully
narrow who is "death eligible." Defense attorneys should impress upon
the Virginia Supreme Court that the Eighth Amendment requires more
guidance and more scrutiny than Virginia currently supplies. If the state
courts do not respond, it seems likely that the federal courts will intervene
in an appropriate case.
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